By any objective measure, private equity has re-entered an expansionary phase. After a slowdown driven by rising interest rates in 2022–2023, dealmaking rebounded meaningfully in 2025 and is carrying momentum into 2026. Global private equity transaction value approached $2 trillion in 2025, up from roughly $1.6 trillion the prior year, even as deal count declined, evidence that capital is concentrating into larger, conviction-driven transactions. Meanwhile, overall buyout and growth deal value rose 17% year-on-year, and exit activity surged more than 40%, aided by a reopening of IPO markets.
This is the environment in which firms like EQT, Apollo Global Management, and CVC Capital Partners are executing their playbooks, rooted in the classic “buy, build, sell” model, but increasingly adapted to a structurally different financial and geopolitical landscape.
The New Deal Cycle: Bigger, Fewer, More Complex
The defining characteristic of recent M&A activity is not just scale, but selectivity. While total deal count fell to roughly 34,300 transactions globally, mega deals above $2.5 billion returned as a dominant force. In the U.S. alone, private equity buyouts exceeded $737 billion in 2025, up over 26% year-on-year.
Sectorally, capital has flowed toward:
- Industrials and infrastructure, where deal value rose nearly 38% to $260.6 billion
- Financial services and fintech, now the largest allocation sector in several datasets
- Technology and healthcare, driven by structural demand and fragmentation
The logic is consistent: these sectors offer either durable cash flows (infrastructure), structural growth (tech), or fragmentation ripe for consolidation (healthcare, financial services).
EQT: Scaling Through Platform Expansion
EQT has emerged as one of the most aggressive capital allocators globally, with approximately €270 billion in AUM and top-tier fundraising credentials. Its strategy increasingly emphasizes platform expansion and ecosystem building rather than isolated buyouts.
A defining move came in 2026 with its $3.7 billion acquisition of Coller Capital, pushing decisively into the secondaries market, an area critical for liquidity in an otherwise illiquid asset class. This reflects a broader thesis: private equity is no longer just about ownership, but about owning the infrastructure of private markets themselves.
EQT’s deal activity reinforces this. Portfolio-related equity capital markets transactions reached $15.2 billion in 2025, nearly 75% higher than the prior year. This signals a pivot toward active portfolio monetization, not just long-term holding.
The firm’s Asia strategy also stands out. Its $15.6 billion Asia buyout fund (2026), the largest in the region, targets structural growth markets such as Japan and India. The rationale is straightforward: demographic shifts, corporate carve-outs, and under-optimized conglomerates create fertile ground for value creation.
Apollo: The Credit-Driven Opportunist
Apollo Global Management operates at the intersection of private equity and private credit, with approximately $840 billion in AUM. Unlike traditional buyout firms, Apollo’s strategy hinges on capital structure arbitrage, identifying mis-priced debt and equity opportunities.
Its 2026 outlook highlights three structural drivers:
- Higher interest rates, which stress corporate balance sheets
- Carve-outs, as corporates divest non-core assets
- “Index crowding,” leaving overlooked assets undervalued
Apollo’s thesis is that value increasingly lies not in bidding wars for premium assets, but in complex situations, distressed credits, hybrid financing, and under followed divisions.
This approach mirrors historical precedents. Following the 2008 financial crisis, Apollo generated outsized returns by acquiring distressed debt and converting it into equity. The same playbook is now being redeployed in a higher-rate world where refinancing risk is rising.
CVC Capital Partners: Consolidation and Control
CVC Capital Partners, with roughly $180 billion in AUM, remains a dominant force in European buyouts. Its strategy leans heavily on control investments and operational transformation, particularly in fragmented industries.
Recent reporting highlights CVC’s interest in acquiring Italian payments group Nexi in a deal potentially worth €9 billion. The rationale is emblematic of modern private equity:
- Buy a depressed asset (Nexi’s valuation has fallen sharply post-IPO)
- Restructure operations (e.g., carve-outs of business units)
- Reposition for long-term growth in digital payments
However, the deal also illustrates growing constraints. Government intervention, via Italy’s “golden power” rules and resistance from strategic shareholders complicate execution. This is increasingly common in sectors deemed strategic, such as fintech and infrastructure.
Competitors and the Arms Race for Scale
The strategies of EQT, Apollo, and CVC are mirrored and intensified by competitors like KKR, Blackstone, and The Carlyle Group.
- KKR continues to dominate fundraising, topping global rankings with over $117 billion raised in recent years
- Blackstone is leaning heavily into infrastructure and data centers, exemplified by multibillion-dollar digital infrastructure deals
- Carlyle maintains diversification across buyouts, credit, and real assets
Across the board, the trend is clear: scale is becoming a competitive moat. Larger firms can:
- Access cheaper financing
- Execute mega deals
- Build integrated platforms across equity, credit, and secondaries
Why They Believe They Will Win
At the core of the “buy, build, sell” strategy is a belief in alpha through transformation, not just financial engineering. Firms justify their optimism through several arguments:
- Operational Value Creation
Private equity increasingly focuses on EBITDA growth via digitalization, cost optimization, and M&A roll-ups. - Market Inefficiencies
As Apollo notes, “overlooked” assets, particularly carve-outs, offer asymmetric upside - Structural Trends
Aging infrastructure, digitization, and demographic shifts create long-term tailwinds. - Capital Overhang Deployment
Years of fundraising have created pressure to deploy capital, particularly into large, scalable opportunities.
Where This Thesis May Be Wrong
Despite the optimism, several structural risks challenge the model:
- Leverage Risk
Private equity remains heavily reliant on debt. With higher interest rates, refinancing becomes more expensive, increasing default risk. Central bank research has already warned that PE-backed firms are more vulnerable to default than peers.
- Exit Uncertainty
The model depends on successful exits. Yet holding periods are increasing, and liquidity events are becoming less predictable, particularly in volatile equity markets.
- Overvaluation in Competitive Auctions
While firms claim to target undervalued assets, intense competition often drives prices higher, compressing future returns.
- Regulatory and Political Risk
Deals like CVC’s Nexi bid highlight rising government scrutiny, especially in strategic sectors such as payments and infrastructure.
- Questionable Social Outcomes
Historical evidence, particularly in healthcare, suggests that private equity ownership can sometimes reduce service quality despite cost efficiencies. This raises reputational and regulatory concerns.
Historical Perspective: Cycles Repeat
The current environment bears resemblance to prior cycles:
- 2005–2007: Abundant leverage fueled mega deals, followed by sharp corrections
- 2009–2013: Distressed investing generated outsized returns
- 2020–2021: Cheap money drove record valuations
Today’s cycle combines elements of all three: large deals, pockets of distress, and selective capital deployment.
Evolution, Not Reinvention
EQT, Apollo, and CVC are not reinventing private equity, they are industrializing it. The shift is from financial engineering toward platform building, from simple buyouts toward ecosystem control, and from abundant cheap leverage toward disciplined capital allocation.
Yet the fundamental tension remains unchanged: returns depend on buying right and exiting well. In a world of higher rates, geopolitical uncertainty, and regulatory scrutiny, that equation is harder than it has been in over a decade.
The art of the deal, it seems, is no longer just about buying low and selling high but about navigating a system that is becoming more complex, more crowded, and more constrained.